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March 19, 2015 | Cory Doctorow

Every issue is a digital issue

It is ten years since Cory Doctorow helped Danny O'Brien and Suw Charman-Anderson found ORG, the UK still needs its own campaigning digital rights group.

A message from ORG Advisory Council and founding member Cory Doctorow on why digital rights matter.

It's been ten years since I helped Danny O'Brien and Suw Charman-Anderson found ORG, because the UK needed its own campaigning digital rights group.

A decade ago, it was rare to hear politicians speaking about the need for a free, open Internet -- and even rarer to meet one who understood what that meant. Despite the number of foot-in-mouth inanities mumbled by today's crop of technologically ignorant pols, it was much, much worse then.

And of course, today, every issue is a digital issue: you can't talk about the economy, security, health or education (let alone elections) without talking about digital rights.

Every issue is a digital issue: from mass surveillance to how you read your ebooks; from parody and making backups to NHS data sharing; and of course, every flavour of privacy, including the phone companies' misuse of your personal information.

Politicians today recognise this, but they don't understand it. Every tech policy out of Westminster is a silly quick-fix that provides a good headline but makes things worse. Think of "web filters" which are supposed to protect children, but still let through mountains of porn, while denying kids access to legitimate, important information and unaccountably blocking access to charities and other sites.

When politicians get it wrong, ORG tells them -- and the world -- about it.

ORG is in it for the right reasons: a society free from unaccountable surveillance and censorship; a state that is transparent and accountable; and an Internet that is available for all as a force for creativity, agency, and freedom.

This election, ORG will make politicians commit to those values. Elections are the one time politicians *have* to listen to the voters.

We need your support so that digital rights are always where they belong: right in the centre of every debate.

ORG is up to *3,000* members, and has been doing fantastic work for a decade. Today ORG celebrates that history by looking to the future with Digital Rights Matter Day. Members are sharing their stories about the importance of digital rights on social media.

That's where you come in: please join and share your story and help us keep the Internet free and open.

https://www.openrightsgroup.org/join

Thank you,
Cory

[Read more]


March 16, 2015 | Jim Killock

GCHQ’s hacking technologies go unregulated and unsupervised

As reported in Wired, GCHQ’s development of hacking technologies is completely absent of external regulation, and their bosses at the Foreign Office lack the ability to understand what they are doing.

This is detailed in last week’s Privacy and Security report from the Intelligence and Security Committee in paragraphs 179–183.

However, the report does not recommend any serious fix to this area of oversight. GCHQ’s hacking technologies, when specific methods are employed and the risks they consider, would continue to be a matter for their judgement alone except in extreme circumstances, even if the ISC’s changes are accepted by government.

The ISC examined GCHQ’s attempts to get around encryption and engage in ‘equipment interference’. They noted that developing these technologies is not subject to any ministerial warrant or external permission (my emphasis):

180. The legal basis for this work is the general power afforded to GCHQ under Section 3(1)(a) of the Intelligence Services Act to:

... monitor or interfere with electromagnetic, acoustic and other emissions and any equipment producing such emissions and to obtain and provide information derived from or related to such emissions or equipment and from encrypted material.

No additional Ministerial Authorisation is required for these activities. There are internal procedures: ***. There is no legal requirement to inform Ministers: however, GCHQ have said that they would ask the Foreign Secretary to approve a specific operation of this kind “where the political or economic risks were sufficiently high” (although, in practice, they manage their operations to avoid this level of risk). GCHQ told the Committee that:

The FCO is aware of the activity and the possible political risk, but individual legal authorisations are not required for each operation. The FCO could assess the political risk of a compromise, it is not well‐placed to assess the complex technical risk. Whilst not formally overseen by a Commissioner, the Intelligence Services Commissioner has been briefed on this type of activity where it relates to individual approved operations.

This is a very frank omission, that GCHQ ‘s hacking techniques are not subject to oversight, and the political masters at the FCO lack the ability to assess the technical risks. Implicitly, the ISC and Intelligence Services Commissioner also fail to look at the risk assessments and technical implications.

Only days ago, Phillip Hammond, the Foreign Secretary and the man in charge claimed:

[The agencies’] actions are subject to detailed Ministerial oversight: between the Prime Minister, the Home Secretary and me, we spend hours every week with the agencies, ensuring that this Government is doing everything it can to keep the British people safe. … 

I regard the independent scrutiny and oversight that the ISC provides as a particular and significant strength of the British system.

However, in relation to hacking technology oversight is absent: the FCO have a policy of “we trust them, they say they know what they are doing, and we wouldn’t understand anyway”. The ISC concludes (my emphasis):

DD. GCHQ need to be able to read the encrypted communications of those who might pose a threat to the UK. We recognise concerns that this work may expose the public to greater risk and could have potentially serious ramifications (both political and economic). We have questioned GCHQ about the risks of their work in this area. They emphasised that much of their work is focused on improving security online. In the limited circumstances where they do *** they would only do so where they are confident that it could not be ***. However, we are concerned that such decisions are only taken internally: Ministers must be kept fully informed of all such work and specifically consulted where it involves potential political and economic risks.

In other words, GCHQ should choose when to inform ministers, but there is an absence of any plan to introduce oversight and assessment of the technical risks. The new policy would amount to: “we trust them, they will tell us if there is a problem. But we don’t want to be bothered with the technical details”.

What should the FCO and ISC be weighing up?

Assessing the appropriateness of GCHQ’s technologies does indeed rest on some very tricky calculations. Hacking tools depend on using problems in software. These can come from known bugs, bugs that GCHQ finds, are given by the NSA or are otherwise presumed to be unknown beyond the agencies, or they can be placed into software. Sometimes encryption may be weakened by simplifying the protocols for instance.

All of these strategies are problematic from one point of view or another. It is very hard to know that if software is broken, the problem will not be discovered and used by someone else. The damage might be felt through action from other agencies or criminal gangs. The people affected could be individuals, banks, or businesses, in any country, not just the UK. The damage could include any kind of financial or data theft, or even acts of sabotage.

Where rare bugs are found or used, security engineers argue that these are the ones they need to know about most, so they can learn from them and anticipate new solutions. So even when GCHQ thinks their exploits are the least likely to be found, they are potentially denying security engineers the opportunity to solve security’s most important new problems. This is the principle of ‘full disclosure’ which has been a foundation stone of security research for decades.

Government should also assume that for every Snowden there are several other people giving secrets quietly to other parties. That will range from organised crime, to foreign agencies, to third parties in order to cause embarrassment and loss of contracts. This of course makes the use of undeclared exploits an even more risky proposition.

Even where well-known bugs are used, GCHQ are creating an incentive not to inform them of specific exploits or press companies into action. And yet GCHQ also has a role, in CESG, in “Information Assurance”, that is to say, improving general security of computer systems in the UK.

Breadth of GCHQ hacking technologies

The hacking operations from GCHQ are enormous. We have reviewed the public information in Chapter two of our report on GCHQ's activities.

It’s important to note that they have huge resource and technology sharing with the NSA (and their equivalents in Canada, Australia and New Zealand) so that their operations are virtually inseparable in many aspects.

The Snowden documents detail very sophisticated operations, where GCHQ use their access to cables to ‘inject’ malware into normal online communications. The documents show they build malware, have created fake LinkedIn pages and emails, and show they have hacked into major companies including Belgacom and Gemalto. Belgacom’s clean up operation has cost them at least £12 million.

There is evidence that GCHQ and NSA share ‘zero day’ (unpublished) bugs. GCHQ specialises in mobile phone hacking (see NOSEYSMURF for instance). Recent allegations also include a CIA programme to break into Apple phones and tablets.

It may be that their decisions are entirely well judged, but they have an incentive to break into many, many computer systems, and create as much access as possible. The risk calculations are very complicated and yet politicians and oversight are, it appears, not involved in these calculations at all.

Consultation on GCHQ hacking

The government is running a consultation on “Equipment Interference” and a proposed Code of Practice. They are doing this because it is one of several areas where the law is highly unclear about what kinds of activity may be taking place, which is likely to fall foul of ECHR requirements for clear surveillance laws. We believe that primary legislation is needed to meet these concerns. While the Code of Practice is an attempt to regulate these actions, it does not focus on the methods and the oversight needed to control risks associated with these tools, so fails to address our concerns. 

Oversight’s task: legality and effectiveness

This lack of attention goes to the heart of what is wrong with current oversight. For a start, oversight is far more reliant on the agencies’ political masters than independent overseers. Ministers have far more chance of forming an accurate view than the ISC, but may also not feel any desire to get into levels of detail. Independent oversight concentrates on the low barrier of ensuring the agencies comply with current laws rather than examining whether their activities are justifiable.

ORG and civil society tend to concentrate on the basic human rights question: are you targeting your response to what is necessary to deal with specific suspects?

On the other hand, ministers and oversight appear to approach GCHQ’s surveillance as a simplistic question of whether they are reducing the risk of terrorist activity to as close to zero as possible. Cameron claimed that he doesn’t want to be the Prime Minister who failed to give the agencies the tools they needed to prevent a murder. Or, as Malcolm Rifkind put it to campaigners at the hearings: is a terrorist atrocity a price worth paying for privacy?

The problem with Cameron and Rifkind’s approach is that their judgements about GCHQ’s work could be placing us at greater risk of a terrorist threat, or other very serious criminal threats, but they have no real idea if they are doing so.

On a broad level, the ISC is failing to assess the relative cost effectiveness of different strategies, for instance of human intelligence versus automated bulk surveillance.

Given that recent terrorist atrocities have all involved people known to the authorities, we might speculate that traditional intelligence may have not been given sufficient resources. GCHQ is extremely costly, and eats up a great proportion of the intelligence budget. How does the Prime Minister and the ISC know whether they are placing resources into the right strategy? How do they establish if they are not in fact being the ISC and Prime Minister that placed people in danger by failing to know what really works?

While hard, ways to achieve these calculations are the subject of intense investigation, including in academia, where it is known as security economics.

No real oversight of GCHQ hacking technologies

In relation to hacking technologies, the FCO and ISC are failing to examine GCHQ’s underlying risk models, the risks GCHQ takes into account and the values they give to different negative outcomes.

Oversight needs a step change. Sometimes we spell this out by saying to them that they need technical advice to understand the problems. To be completely clear, the ISC, Commissioners and political masters such as the FCO need to understand the risk modelling and make their own cost-benefits analysis. Without technical understanding of their own, they cannot make the calculations. Without making the calculations, they are blindly trusting GCHQ.

While Foreign Secretary Phillip Hammond claims that “independent scrutiny and oversight of the ISC provides … a particular and significant strength of the British system” the ISC has in fact admitted that it and the FCO are absent of the necessary knowledge to understand the risks they are undoubtedly running.

[Read more]


March 12, 2015 | Ed Paton-Williams

What the ISC missed - ORG's quick take on the ISC report

These are our first impressions on reading the Intelligence and Security Committee's key recommendations in its Privacy and Security Report.

The Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) today released the results of their inquiry into GCHQ's surveillance.

The main recommendation of the report is a new act of Parliament to consolidate the current "complicated" and "piecemeal" legal framework into a single piece of legislation. It is important that the legal framework is clear and comprehensible but it will be more important to constrain the agencies to provide Internet users with greater protection from surveillance.

The report says "the agencies do not seek to circumvent the law" but in leaked documents, the agencies themselves say the UK has a light oversight regime. This suggests that they don't need to circumvent the law because the law is weak.

The report deals with GCHQ's mass surveillance under the term "bulk interception capability". In its assessment, the ISC has tried to minimise the extent and impact of bulk collection. They say that "GCHQ are not reading the emails of everyone in the UK" (our emphasis).

GCHQ analysts may not be physically reading all our emails on their screens but GCHQ is collecting huge amounts of information and getting powerful computers to process and analyse it.

The report perpetuates the problematic approach that our privacy is only intruded when a human looks at the content of our communications. It ignores the invasiveness of profiling using metadata.

The key recommendations focus on communications' content when assessing the impacts of bulk collection on our privacy. The committee only talks of "targeted searches" that GCHQ analysts can do on intercepted communications. But leaked documents from Snowden show that analysts can do very broad searches on metadata such as 'all users of X technology in country Y'.

The ISC says GCHQ only has access to a small fraction of the global Internet infrastructure. They ignore however the fact GCHQ works in close partnership with the NSA and the intelligence agencies of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Germany, Sweden and many other countries. This gives GCHQ much greater access than the committee has acknowledged.

The current legal framework allows for the bulk collection of communications of anyone in the UK when they communicate with people abroad. The committee tries to re-assure us that the agencies cannot search that pool of data for individuals in the UK without specific Ministerial authorisation for a named target. There are outstanding questions on this area, such as how GCHQ handles metadata from these communications, and to what extent GCHQ computers analyse this data to discover so-called "unknown threats"

We welcome the calls for increased transparency in the legal framework governing surveillance. But GCHQ's “Neither Confirm Nor Deny” policy must be reduced to what is strictly necessary. We also need transparency regarding GCHQ's collaboration with the NSA and other countries' intelligence agencies.

The report makes no recommendations on how GCHQ's data-sharing with NSA and other allies should be properly regulated. They simply propose to introduce a warrant system and processes for exchanging intelligence reports. But this would not cover the broad range of activities uncovered by Snowden.

The committee makes some recommendations to reform intrusion by the agencies but these fall short of properly regulating GCHQ's cyber offensive capabilities and collaboration. There is also very little mention of the implications of data sharing and the integration of GCHQ and the NSA for the UK's foreign policy.

The ISC has produced some interesting detail, with some practical suggestions but the fundamental issues are not addressed. Nor do they explain why they didn't ask these questions and write this report prior to the Snowden leaks.

We will publish a much fuller analysis of the report once we've had time to read and digest it.

You can read ORG's report on GCHQ's activities here.

[Read more] (1 comments)


March 10, 2015 | Ed Paton-Williams

MPs criticise TTIP on corporate courts and lack of transparency

A committee of MPs released a report today on TTIP (the Trans-Atlantic Trade & Investment Partnership) - the trade agreement being negotiated in secret by the EU and the USA. The House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee's report focuses on the risks posed to the environment by TTIP.

But they also raise serious concerns about the transparency of the negotiations and ISDS (Investor-State Dispute Settlement) - a measure allowing foreign companies to sue the European Union and/or Member State governments if they pass laws which would negatively affect their future profits.

ORG shares these concerns and has raised them in the past.

On ISDS, the committee flags up that neither the UK Government nor the EU has presented a convincing case for the inclusion of ISDS. They also raise concerns about the chilling effect of ISDS on future legislation.

EU states must retain their 'right to regulate', but a TTIP treaty text that enshrines such a safeguard will be meaningless if the prospect of ISDS litigation produces a chilling effect on future regulation-setting. A compelling case for the inclusion of an ISDS in TTIP has not yet been made, and there are unresolved doubts about how well international arbitration courts would operate. If there is to be an ISDS, the parties will need to agree a robustly framed one which prevents unwarranted litigation, adopting the lessons from the recently negotiated ISDS provisions in the EU/Canada trade treaty, to circumscribe the terms on which litigation could be initiated against policies to improve environmental or health protections. (page 19-20)

Many people are concerned that Governments could be discouraged from passing new legislation due to ISDS. If the Government passed legislation that would impact on a foreign company's profits, it would risk having to pay to defend itself at a tribunal and then paying out compensation if it lost the case. The Department for Business argued in its representation to the committee that there is no cause for concern but the committee's disagreed and concluded that ISDS could produce a chilling effect.

On transparency, the committee is concerned that the secretive nature of the negotations makes it impossible to judge whether the risks to environmental safeguards are being dealt with. This is exactly the same problem that we have with digital rights issues in TTIP. We know that negotiations are happening on our issues but because of the lack of transparency we cannot fully analyse whether the risks to our digital rights are being adequately handled.

TTIP potentially presents risks for environmental safeguards, as we have described in this report, but there is also scope for these to be satisfactorily addressed. That depends on the detail of the deal that is struck. At the current stage in the negotiations there is not the transparency needed to be able to reach a view on whether such risks will be dealt with. EU member states, including the UK, will need to be more closely involved in the negotiations from now on, and engage in turn with environmental groups and agencies, to ensure that environmental issues are adequately considered. The next Government should ensure that the public and the House are given a full and timely opportunity to scrutinise the draft terms of any TTIP settlement before it is a done deal. (page 23)

The committee's sentence at the end of that quote speaks to one of ORG's major concerns. We do not want a situation where the first time we can properly scrutinise a trade agreement negotiated on our behalf is when the terms of the agreement are already locked up. It is undemocratic to decide on important trade measures behind closed doors.

We hope the British Government and the European Commission will take on board the recommendations of this House of Commons report.

[Read more]


March 10, 2015 | Ed Paton-Williams

More MPs criticise TTIP on transparency and ISDS

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmbis/804/804.pdf

House of Commons Business, Innovation and Skills Committee

It's been just two weeks since a committee of the House of Commons



We do not believe that the case has yet been made for ISDS clauses in TTIP. (page 3)

We have yet to be convinced of the need for ISDS provisions in TTIP. The UK Government and the EU must demonstrate that the advanced legal institutions of the EU and the US cannot protect foreign investors before any ISDS is considered in the TTIP. (page 18)



The European Commission is currently consulting Member States on the ISDS provisions. We are deeply concerned that the UK Government is not planning to sub mit a formal response to that consultation. We disagree with this approach. We argue that a formal response should be submitted and for that response to be made available for public scrutiny. (page 3)

We are deeply concerned by the Minister’s statement that there will not be any formal response by the Government to the European Commission’s consultati on on ISDS with Member States. It does not give the impression that the Government is treating seriously the concerns that have been raised about the range or use of such clauses and serves only to fuel the existing scepticism held by opponents of TTIP. It also has the potential to leave the UK on the margins of any debate to better frame ISDS negotiations. We recommend that the Government produces a formal response to the consultation exercise and for it to be published at the same time it is submitted to the European Commission. (page 18-19)

The negotiation process for TTIP is on-going and much of the detail has yet to be either agreed or made public. It is therefore not possible to come to a definitive conclusion on the benefits or risks of an extensive trade agreement between the EU and the US. Unfortunately, in the absence of that detail or undertakings that negotiating texts will be made public, the debate on the trade agreement has become polarised. The current European Trade Commissioner, Ms Malmström, is moving the European Commission in the right direction by making more information public. However, too much detail remains beyond public scrutiny. (page 22)   

 

 

 

 

 

A committee of MPs released a report today on TTIP (the Trans-Atlantic Trade & Investment Partnership) - the trade agreement being negotiated in secret by the EU and the USA. The House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee's report focuses on the risks posed to the environment by TTIP.

But they also raise serious concerns about the transparency of the negotiations and ISDS (Investor-State Dispute Settlement) - a measure allowing foreign companies to sue the European Union and/or Member State governments if they pass laws which would negatively affect their future profits.

ORG shares these concerns and has raised them in the past.

On ISDS, the committee flags up that neither the UK Government nor the EU has presented a convincing case for the inclusion of ISDS. They also raise concerns about the chilling effect of ISDS on future legislation.

EU states must retain their 'right to regulate', but a TTIP treaty text that enshrines such a safeguard will be meaningless if the prospect of ISDS litigation produces a chilling effect on future regulation-setting. A compelling case for the inclusion of an ISDS in TTIP has not yet been made, and there are unresolved doubts about how well international arbitration courts would operate. If there is to be an ISDS, the parties will need to agree a robustly framed one which prevents unwarranted litigation, adopting the lessons from the recently negotiated ISDS provisions in the EU/Canada trade treaty, to circumscribe the terms on which litigation could be initiated against policies to improve environmental or health protections. (page 19-20)

Many people are concerned that Governments could be discouraged from passing new legislation due to ISDS. If the Government passed legislation that would impact on a foreign company's profits, it would risk having to pay to defend itself at a tribunal and then paying out compensation if it lost the case. The Department for Business argued in its representation to the committee that there is no cause for concern but the committee's disagreed and concluded that ISDS could produce a chilling effect.

On transparency, the committee is concerned that the secretive nature of the negotations makes it impossible to judge whether the risks to environmental safeguards are being dealt with. This is exactly the same problem that we have with digital rights issues in TTIP. We know that negotiations are happening on our issues but because of the lack of transparency we cannot fully analyse whether the risks to our digital rights are being adequately handled.

TTIP potentially presents risks for environmental safeguards, as we have described in this report, but there is also scope for these to be satisfactorily addressed. That depends on the detail of the deal that is struck. At the current stage in the negotiations there is not the transparency needed to be able to reach a view on whether such risks will be dealt with. EU member states, including the UK, will need to be more closely involved in the negotiations from now on, and engage in turn with environmental groups and agencies, to ensure that environmental issues are adequately considered. The next Government should ensure that the public and the House are given a full and timely opportunity to scrutinise the draft terms of any TTIP settlement before it is a done deal. (page 23)

The committee's sentence at the end of that quote speaks to one of ORG's major concerns. We do not want a situation where the first time we can properly scrutinise a trade agreement negotiated on our behalf is when the terms of the agreement are already locked up. It is undemocratic to decide on important trade measures behind closed doors.

We hope the British Government and the European Commission will take on board the recommendations of this House of Commons report.

[Read more]


March 05, 2015 | Ruth Coustick-Deal

Digital Rights Matter Day: Coming soon

On Thursday 19th March we're giving our membership and campaign funding one big boost: Take part in #digitalrightsmatter day.

Help us hit 3000 supporters!

Crowd of people waving Join ORG signs

It’s only March but we've already had some great successes:

  • We halted an attempt to re-introduce the Snoopers’ Charter.
    Four Lords tried to insert the next of the discredited Communications Data Bill into a seperate Bill, as a last minute 'ammendment'. We raised awareness of this sneaky abuse of democratic process, with our members writing and calling Lords before the big debate. The amendments have now been withdrawn but we'll keep watch in case they try this again.
  • We opposed a national ID register for Scotland.
    The Scottish government announced plans that would create a national ID register in a little-publicised consultation. We galvanised our supporters to respond, alerted the media and met with MSPs to make sure these plans are not passed without a full political debate.

  • We launched ORG Scotland
    We are hiring a new position to shape the future of ORG's work in Scotland and we've been in Scotland the last few weeks meeting grassroots activists, academics, lawyers and politicians to hear what they want for digital rights in Scotland.

All this shows exactly what we can do when we get the momentum going.

Our campaign for General Election in May, is our most ambitious yet – seeking to engage and inspire the next generation of MPs to commit to defending the Internet. 

So far this year we've had 180 new members join to help kick off our election campaign:

  1. ORG’s ‘Civil Liberties’ Hustings will be going ahead in April in Brighton, Bristol, Cardiff and Manchester. We’ve now got other local groups on board including branches of 38 Degrees and Friends of the Earth.

    The one time that we know that politicians are likely to listen to us is during the run up to a General Election when candidates want to know which issues voters care about. Questioning candidates face to face is more effective than email, social media or letters. So we’re organising political hustings so that we can ask candidates directly for their views on a range of human rights issues. These hustings are not just about digital rights because we think its important for candidates to understand that digital rights are human rights; they are not a fringe issue, and protecting them is vital for our freedom. Stay tuned for confirmed venues and dates in the next few weeks!
  1. ORG are excited to be working with Democracy Club to improve how candidates, campaigners and voters communicate! We're building a website that aggregates questions from organisations and puts them to candidates in batches. You’ll be able to see what parliamentary candidates in your constituencies have said on a wide range of issues - and we also aim to help candidates manage the flood of correspondence landing in their inboxes between now and May.

We're proud of all our supporters and activists have helped us achieve. 

On Thursday 19th March we're giving our membership and campaign funding one big boost: Take part in #digitalrightsmatter day.

We’re asking people to join ORG on March 19th to help us to get 300 new members so far this year, taking us to over 3,000 in total.  For people to take notice, we need to all share it together at once.

Celebrate your membership of ORG and raise awareness of our one-day fundraiser for our campaign work by signing up to our Thunderclap.

Support the Thunderclap

HOW TO SHOW YOUR SUPPORT:

  1. Support our action day via Twitter, Facebook, and other social media, and get the word out to your friends and followers to do the same.
  2. Tell us why our work is relevant to you using #digitalrightsmatter. We’ll tweet & share your stories on the day.
  3. Watch as everyone's messages are simultaneously shared.
  4. Can you help ORG and give out flyers to promote our work? Share at your local hackspace or craftspace or office? Just contact ruth@openrightsgroup.org and I'll send you some in the post.
  5. Ask a friend to join

[Read more]


February 26, 2015 | Jim Killock

GCHQ is damaging businesses and the digital economy – we need your help

Politicians are often deaf to arguments against mass surveillance. They will talk about encryption as if it’s for criminals, and tell people that “if you’ve nothing to hide, you’ve nothing to fear”.

But it is the Internet economy that is at risk, just as much as our civil liberties. Politicians need to know this.

Digital businesses should be fearing for the future. According to the government, GCHQ has apparently done nothing substantially wrong. Hacking into legitimate businesses, stealing data or SIM encryption keys is ok. Owning Belgacom’s networks with GCHQ malware is just targeting terrorists. Who cares if it costs them £12 million to clean up the mess GCHQ has made?

Digital businesses depend on customer trust, including trust of encryption tools, which are used for all kinds of secure transactions. Cloud services need to be trusted as secure, rather than surveillance platforms, or they won’t be used.

But is any of this being heard? On the one hand, the government says that Britain needs to be a digital success story, and promotes projects like “Silicon Roundabout”. On the other, it is undermining the very basics you rely on, like the rule of law, Internet security and customer trust.

The government’s story on digital economy doesn’t make sense. None of the parties seem to be spelling this out. So we need your help. 

We need people in business to help us publicly by explaining in the press, and to key politicians, that GCHQ cannot carry on in this way without seriously damaging the online economy.

If you have experience of this, or simply think politicians are getting this wrong, and are willing to speak up, please let us know.

Email us, send us your telephone number, and we’ll talk with you about how you can help politicians understand the damage they are creating to jobs and the digital economy.

[Read more]


February 25, 2015 | Ruth Coustick-Deal

CITIZENFOUR: Best documentary of 2014 on tonight

The Oscar and BAFTA winning CITIZENFOUR will be shown on Channel 4 tonight. The film shows the scale of the surveillance undertaken by the intelligence agencies behind our backs, and the story of Edward Snowden.

Flyer promoting CITIZENFOUR

In response to Edward Snowden’s revelations that GCHQ and the NSA were invading the privacy of ordinary citizens through programmes unknown to the public, and to the politicians, ORG joined with Article 19, Big Brother Watch, English PEN, Liberty, and Privacy International to form the Don't Spy on Us coalition.

Today, the Oscar and BAFTA winning documentary CITIZENFOUR will be shown on Channel 4, and we encourage you to watch it and spread the word.

Pre-film live Q&A: 9pm on Twitter. Join the conversation on #CITIZENFOUR with experts from the Don’t Spy On Us campaign and journalist Ewen MacAskill from the Guardian. There is a live-blog on the Q&A with the audience reaction here.

Citizen Four: 11.05pm, Channel Four

Months into the production of CITIZENFOUR, already underway as a surveillance documentary, Edward Snowden contacted Laura to tell her he wished to blow the whistle on the NSA’s programmes. What followed was one of the most remarkable scoops in the history of film-making, an achievement recognised by the Oscar for 'best documentary'. You can read why the Oscar matters here.

We’d really appreciate it if you could help us to spread the word and let people know that the film will be showing on Channel 4 at 23:05 on the 25th February. You can either tweet about it or reach out to people via other social media platforms.

The film really brings home the scale of the surveillance undertaken by the intelligence agencies behind our backs. With just over two months until the General Election, it's important that as many people as possible see the CitizenFour.

Click on the image below to retweet and support the film:

Britdoc Tweet promoting CITIZENFOUR

[Read more]


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