Data retention in the EU following the CJEU ruling

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>How the Directive was implemented in the relevant country</th>
<th>The response to the CJEU ruling in the relevant country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>In 2009 the European Commission began proceedings against Austria for breaching EU law by failing to implement the EU Data Retention Directive. These proceedings resulted in the European Court of Justice ruling against Austria in 2010. Austria's reluctance primarily stemmed from major data protection and privacy concerns.</td>
<td>On the 8 April 2014, the ECJ declared the Data Retention Directive to be invalid. On 12 June a public hearing at the supreme constitutional court was held. There the Austrian government argued that data retention was a valuable tool and negated the view of the ECJ that suspicion-less mass surveillance would violate the ECHR. On 27 June 2014 the Austrian supreme constitutional court declared the DRD implementation in Austria to be not proportionate and unconstitutional and void. The Austrian court found the implementation to be invalid because it: • violated the fundamental right to data protection; • violated article 8 EHRC; • the Austria telecommunications law, the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Sicherheitspolizeigesetz (“security police law”) did not contain sufficient safeguards for the retention, access and security of the retained data. In particular: o numerous precise safeguards in the law were missing, e.g. concerning the exact arrangement of the retention duties, the necessary preconditions for access to the DR data or the duty to delete the DR data; and o data retention's &quot;mean variation&quot; exceeded any previous judgements in scope, concerning the fundamental right to data protection, both in relation to the affected persons (nearly every citizen is affected) as well as the nature of the DR data and the modality of their usage. The court said that measures such as data retention could constitute valid means to prosecute severe crimes, but only then when conformity with data protection and human rights laws was ensured. The combined Austrian laws challenged here however constituted a disproportionate interference and thereby a violation of the fundamental right to data protection. On the 30 June, the supreme constitutional court’s decision was announced by the Federal Chancellor and the decision came into effect on 1 July.</td>
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In February 2011, Viviane Reding demanded that Austria finally implemented the directive or otherwise faced stiff charges. Therefore, after years of discussions, the Austrian government finally decided to implement the directive. From November 2009 until January 2010 a legislative proposal for an amendment to the Telekommunikationsgesetz (TKG) was open for public surveying. The law proposal came from the Ludwig Boltzmann Institute, which was tasked by the ministry for traffic, innovation and technology (BMVIT) to create a law proposal that would try to impact human and civil rights as few as possible. The law draft was subsequently slightly changed by political processes and that slightly changed law proposal was enacted by the Austrian parliament on 18 May 2011. There were demonstrations against the Austrian DR implementation on 21 April 2011 in two major cities in Austria. According to that law, from 1 April 2012 Austrian providers had to retain their customers’ (meta) data for 6 months and had to delete it within another month. There were again demonstrations on 31 March 2012 in five large cities.

A special mechanism was invented that allowed LEAs or general attorneys to query the retained data that should ensure transparency and exclude misuse, the so-called “Durchlaufstelle” (roughly translated to ‘traversing place’). However, the mechanism allowed bypassing of the traversing place, including any logging of the access, if the agent querying the database stated it was very urgent (e.g. in cases of kidnapping).

All in all the Austrian data retention law tried to minimise human and civil rights violations but in some areas the implementation could have been better and more restrictive. For example LEA was able to query the database in cases of severe crimes (on the basis of a warrant) but as the directive did not spell out what constituted severe crimes, Austria defined severe crimes as being all crimes that had a minimum sentence of 12 month in prison. This lead to the fact that not only cases of terrorism, organised crime or murder justified the query of the data retention data but also crimes like polygamy. Another problem of the implementation of the directive was that it allowed the intermediaries to store the customer data in countries other than Austria.

On the same day, 1 July, the first major provider (T-Mobile) announced, that they had already deleted the DR data. Other providers claimed this to be a technical challenge and that it would take some time to delete all DR data. On 7 July, most small providers had deleted the data, the big provider “3” announced that it had already started to delete the data. Only the third large provider in Austria had not started to delete the data yet.

On 10 July, the Austrian minister of the interior announced, that “working without data retention data would not make working any easier” and announced, that she planned to create a new law concerning the protection of the state. However, she said, the new law...
Data retention in the EU following the CJEU ruling

And yet another severe shortcoming of the implementation was the security of the retained data: here the Ludwig Bolzmann Institute for human rights ran out of time in the law drafting process. Therefore another law was referenced that was never suited for this particular job. This lead to the fact that the security of the retained data was not audited by a single ISP during the whole time the directive was active in Austria, because the office tasked with auditing the retention data never had enough resources (time, money and skilled technicians) nor did an actual need for them to audit this data arise from the law that was referenced for that very purpose.

The final implementation of the DR directive did not stop the protests. In October 2011 activists in Austria had started an online petition against data retention and to demand a review of all anti-terrorist legislation. The petition was signed by 106,067 people by 30 May 2012, making it the most successful online petition ever in Austria. The petition was initially launched on 17 October 2011 (offline). On 14 December 2011, 4471 signatures were handed over to the parliament then the online petition was launched.

On 12 March 2012, the Austrian parliament dealt with the petition for the first time. The parliament passed the petition to the justice committee, which on 28th of November 2012 decided to do mostly nothing about it: the data retention was already challenged before the ECJ and the petitions demand for an evaluation of all anti-terror related laws was simply ignored by the committee.

Then, on 15 June 2012, a lawsuit was filed (by three different parties), including one where 11,130 citizens acted as plaintiffs, after the petition was filed but before the parliament dealt with it. It was a constitutional complaint before Austria’s supreme constitutional court, challenging the constitutionality of data retention. Following this complaint, the Austrian supreme constitutional court filed questions for the ECJ for a preliminary ruling. The supreme constitutional court shared the concerns expressed in the lawsuit and therefore presented the European Court of Justice with some questions on 28 November 2012.

In June 2012 the Austrian parliament had dealt with the petition against the DR directive in a most unsatisfying way, arguing among other things, that it would be wise to wait for the end of the lawsuit first. Whereby the demand for a re-evaluation of all anti-terror related laws was completely ignored and silently dropped.

Finally the ECJ declared the DR directive void and passed the case back to the Austrian supreme constitutional court, which on 27 July 2014 declared the DR implementation to be in breach of the constitution.

would not be related to the overturned data retention law. On the 30 July, the written court decision was published.

In late September 2014, Austrian Justice Minister Wolfgang Brandstetter (ÖVP) expressed that he's aiming for a data retention comeback, where data access should only be permitted for "very severe crimes". He expressed hope for a joint drafting process for this together with other justice experts from other parties. Minister of Interior Johanna MIkl-Leitner (ÖVP) welcomed the suggestion. The need for DR was now argued with the Islamic State (IS) and possible activities of IS in Austria. The Greens, AK Vorrat and the Austrian Internet Service Providers Association (ISPA) criticised this heavily.

On 26 September 2014, Maria Wittmann-Tiwald, chairwoman of the association of judges' specialized group for fundamental rights, warned of such a hastily amendment. Without evaluation of the exact need for DR data and technical possibilities, the strict fundamental rights conditions set by the CJEU could not be met, she declared. However, she also said that DR could be justified by the fight against "most severe crimes" whereas terrorism would not provide any justification for DR in Austria.

On 27 October 2014, Minister of Interior Johanna MIkl-Leitner (ÖVP) announced within the home affairs committee, that a follow up DR regulation was definitely about to come. This was again argued on the basis of IS fighters, despite the fact that DR data had proven to be meaningless in the fight against terrorism in Austria during the time DR data was present.

On 11 November 2014, Minister of Infrastructure Alois Stöger (SPÖ) announced, that he was not planning to reintroduce DR at present but that he would not resist talks about a reintroduction of DR if Justice and Home Affairs ministries saw a need for it.

In late November 2014, the political party NEOS discovered that nobody felt responsible for controlling whether the old DR data had ever actually been deleted. On 12 December, this then resulted in a motion for a resolution to the National Council for a law that should enable the verification of the deletion of the DR data.
<table>
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<th>Country</th>
<th>Overview</th>
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| Czech Republic | There has been new data retention legislation in the Czech republic since November 2012. It was implemented after the Czech constitutional court decision in March 2011. The court declared the section of the Electronic Communications Act and its implementing legislation unconstitutional and repealed it. According to the court statement, ambiguous definition of data retention rules results in a situation where such “measures as to request and use retained data are being overused by authorities engaged in criminal proceedings for purposes related to investigation of common, i.e. less serious crimes”. According to the Court, it will be necessary to consider each individual case in which data have already been requested in order to be used in criminal proceedings one by one, with respect to the principle of proportionality regarding privacy rights infringement.

The new legislation § 97/3+4 of the Electronic communication act and changes to many other acts (especially Penal Procedure Code) was implemented in the weaker variation of the DRD and it reacted to the constitutional court decision (for example 6 month period for data retention, court control, limitation of the crimes, subsidiarity).

However, this did not affect the number of applications for the data (in 2013 about 10,000 per month). Even leaving aside the issue that mass surveillance is an unconstitutional interference with human rights, the new legislation ignores the current situation where the Police Act authorizes the police to use the data outside of criminal proceedings. Under the current Police Act, police officers may require data more or less without any limits, without court supervision and without any clearly defined and controlled processes. The Czech legislation is not available in English.

The Czech government has prepared no response or changes. In the opinion of the Ministry of interior, the Czech implementation of the directive is in accordance with CJEU ruling. ISPs have no problem with this reaction because they receive money for retention of the data. Civil society (IuRe) intends to prepare another constitutional complaint based on CJEU decision about the unconstitutionality of mass surveillance but it is not yet known when this will happen.

| Denmark | About the directive:
• Danish data retention law adopted in 2002 in the wake of 9/11.
• Law authorizes the Justice Minister to set the legal requirements for telecommunications providers.
• The Administrative order for data retention was adopted in September 2006 and took effect in September 2007.
• The four year delay was due to (1) Danish rules postponed so they would fully accord with the EU requirements and (2) technical difficulties with specifying workable data retention rules.

Areas where the Danish directive exceeds EU
• ISP session logging - which requires retention of the following data for every 500th internet packet transmitted by the ISP: source and destination IP address, |

Reaction from the Danish Government on the ruling:
• The Minister of Justice presented a legal analysis of the ruling.
• The Ministry of Justice then noted that the CJEU ruling on data retention is based on three elements:
  1. The directive covers all electronic communication for all persons (paras. 57-59). There is no difference between the Danish law and the directive with respect to the points in paragraphs 57-59.
  2. The directive does not contain objective criteria for access to the retained data (paras. 60-62). The Danish Administration of Justice Act contains rules for access to the data. A prior court order is required, except in urgent cases, and there must be grounds for suspicion against the individual whose retained data is accessed. Also, access is restricted to “serious crime”, where the main rule is a prison term of six years or more. However, a number of
source and destination port number, transport protocol (e.g. TCP or UDP) and timestamp. The session logging must be done at the boundary of the network, where the ISP exchanges internet packets with other ISPs.

- For mobile phone communication, the Danish rules require the retention of the first and last cell used during the communication. The Directive only requires the first cell.
- If the internet service is provided through a WiFi hotspot, the geographical location of the hotspot must be registered.
- The Directive applies to "publicly available electronic communications services or public communications networks", whereas the Danish rules apply to all providers of electronic communication services on a commercial basis, whether public or not. Only public institutions, workplaces (internet access for their employees) and public educational institutions are excluded from the Danish data retention requirements. A coffee shop providing WiFi access to their customers would be covered by the Danish data retention requirements as a provider of telecom services. According to comments in the 2002 law, the purpose of including non-public providers in the data retention requirements was to ensure a fair level of competition between public and non-public providers.

**Controversy?**

- The 2002 law containing data retention and other anti-terror provisions was adopted with a 10:1 majority in parliament.
- The Danish Institute of Human Rights and the NGO Digital Rights (a founding member of EDRi) raised several objections, including that blanket data retention was in breach of ECHR Article 8, as the requirements for proportionality were not satisfied. Until the CJEU ruling on 8 April 2014, the response from the Danish Ministry of Justice to this objection has consistently been that "to the extent that data retention is an interference with the fundamental rights to privacy under Article 8, this interference is justified as it is necessary and proportional".

**Data retention in the EU following the CJEU ruling**

1. **New legislation from the government about data retention?**
   - Next year the Danish government is going to propose a revision of the data retention rules.
   - This could lead to a reduction in data retention, yet that is highly unlikely as the Danish government is overall very in favour of data retention.
   - The Minister of Justice emphasized that she liked the idea of session logging, but any new rules for such would be highly controversial.

2. **Legal challenges and reactions from ISPs**
   - The Danish telecom providers and ISPs have not challenged the data retention rules, neither formally (in court) nor through civil disobedience (as Bahnhof in Sweden).
   - There have not been any legal challenges to data retention by other groups.
   - Denmark does not have a constitutional court, so if citizens believe that a law violates the Danish constitution, the Charter of Fundamental Rights or the European Convention on Human Rights, they have to go through the regular court system, a procedure which is quite burdensome.

| Finland | Sähköisen viestinnän tietosuojalaki (Act on the Protection of Privacy in Electronic Communications, law 516/2004) was amended to add sections 14a, 14b and 14c (amendment law 343/2008) that implement data retention. An English translation of the law will be in force from 1 January 2015. The data retention provisions were transferred into | criminal offences with shorter maximum prison sentences than six years are also included, in particular criminal offences where multiple offenders are likely to work together and use electronic communication for their criminal activities. | 3. **The retention period is not based on objective criteria** (paras. 63-64). The Ministry of Justice argues that the retention period in the Danish law is based on objective criteria. The retention period is one year for all types of data, but the Ministry of Justice cites preparatory work for the 2002 data retention law in which the one-year retention period was justified on ground that terrorist attacks such as 9/11 are often planned for more than six months, so a retention period of one year would be appropriate. |

- Session logging was removed voluntarily by the Ministry of Justice by a revised administrative order (based on the 2002 data retention law). The Danish government maintains that this change was not because of the CJEU ruling, but because the Danish police have been entirely unable to use the data from session logging.
- The Danish data retention law still exceeds the requirements in the now invalid Directive, but session logging accounted for at least 90 percent of the retained data, so there has been a sizeable reduction.

Finland has recently finished a reform of communications and Internet related legislation (tietoyhteiskuntakaari = Information Society Code; government bill HE 221/2013). The new law was in force from 1 January 2015. The data retention provisions were transferred into
Data retention in the EU following the CJEU ruling

The government bill regarding the amendment was HE 158/2007. How it was implemented:
• retention time 12 months;
• costs to operators are compensated;
• but only operators of certain size are obliged.

Data retention was debated publicly and received lot of criticism from NGOs and also from the politicians of the ruling parties. The government bill was reviewed by the Constitutional Law Committee of the parliament (opinion PeVL 3/2008). The Committee did not find any major problems with the constitutionality of the law. In the voting in the parliament, many parliamentarians who voted for the bill defended their position saying this is something that we don't really need but the EU law requires it, sort of outsourcing their responsibility to Brussels.


The following changes were made compared to the previous DR provisions. The effect of the DRI ruling can be seen in the separate retention times and the narrowing down of the data types:
1. no reference to the Directive;
2. obligated operators: those with certain size and ordered by the Ministry of Interior to retain the data (previously: no order required)
3. retained data:
   • services: mobile phone (calls and sms), Internet phone, Internet access (previously also e-mail, landline and some insignificant data services)
   • what data: user/subscriber name, address, connection ID, identification of the user, type of communication, recipient, date/time, length, device ID, location of the device in the beginning of the communication, address of the access point (unchanged)
4. retention period shortened (previously 12 months):
   • mobile phone calls and sms: 12 months
   • Internet access: 9 months
   • Internet phone: 6 months

The draft bill contained the following but it was removed due to criticism from the Constitutional Law Committee of the parliament. It would have allowed retention of metadata produced from “browsing of websites” or “other data” if retention is necessary to identify the user of an email service, Internet phone service or Internet access. “Other data” is not defined. It could mean the content of a message. This and retention of URLs accessed is problematic.

The following is new compared to previous law. The Minister of Interior can build a system where the ISPs could store the retained data. Use of the system would be voluntary but it is likely using that system would reduce their costs so it would be likely that the system will be used, effectively creating a centralised database for the state. The law does not define any specific safeguards regarding security of or access to this database. The general rule of court permission would probably apply, as well as general data protection rules.

At the time of the judgment the Constitutional Law Committee was preparing its opinion on the Information Society Code. In the final opinion (PeVL 18/2014), the Committee criticised data retention in general for violating the principle of proportionality, based on DRI.
### Data retention in the EU following the CJEU ruling

| Germany | In Germany the implementation exceeded the Directive's requirements in several ways:  
|         | • Anonymization services had to log IP assignments (not covered by Directive)  
|         | • Data access not only for prosecuting serious crime but any crime committed via telecommunications (eg IP infringements)  
|         | • Also for preventing crime and for purposes of intelligence agencies  
|         | • Identification of subscribers (including users of dynamically assigned IP addresses) and requesting subscriber data permitted "for the prosecution of criminal or administrative offences, for averting danger to public safety or order and for the discharge of the legal functions of the federal and state authorities for the protection of the Constitution, the Federal Intelligence Service and the Federal Armed Forces Counter-Intelligence Office"  
|         | • Users of prepaid services are (still) required to provide identification data  
|         | • Subscriber data is (still) to be stored for 1-2 years, otherwise 6 months  
|         | • IP address of senders and receivers of e-mails were to be stored  
|         | Implementation was highly controversial and led to mass protests and complaints to constitutional court. Even today more than 70% of the population reject blanket retention (which is not in force).\textsuperscript{34}  
|         | The German Constitutional Court annulled the law in 2010 on the grounds of the German constitution.\textsuperscript{35} The Directive was not re-implemented following the Court decision.  
|         | Germany will probably not enact another data retention instrument unless the EU makes it compulsory.  
|         | The German Minister of the Interior has publicly called on the EU for new data retention legislation.  
| Ireland | Implemented through the Communications (Retention of Data) Act 2011. 24mths retention for telephony; 12mths for internet. Definitions regarding data to be stored are taken verbatim from the Directive. Access is internal within police, revenue and army in respect of the following:  
|         | 1. A member of the Garda Síochána not below the rank of chief superintendent may request a service provider to disclose data retained by the service provider where that member is satisfied that the data are required for:  
|         | The Digital Rights Ireland case continues and the 2011 Act remains in force in the meantime.  
|         | The government is not preparing new legislation.  
|         | ISPs haven't been asked to delete data or stop collecting by any party as far as people are aware. The 2011 Act as a piece of primary law (rather than delegated legislation) does not automatically fall following the ECJ ruling, though obviously Digital Rights Ireland are |
Data retention in the EU following the CJEU ruling

(a) the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of a serious offence; 
(b) the safeguarding of the security of the State; and 
(c) the saving of human life.

2. An officer of the Permanent Defence Force not below the rank of colonel may request a service provider to disclose to that officer data retained by the service provider where that officer is satisfied that the data are required for the purpose of safeguarding the security of the State.

3. An officer of the Revenue Commissioners not below the rank of principal officer may request a service provider to disclose to that officer data retained where that officer is satisfied that the data are required for the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of a revenue offence.

There is very limited judicial oversight by means of a single paragraph (literally) annual report.

The powers are extensively used in respect of quite minor crimes and the safeguards of prior internal authorisation are often ignored with retrospective rubber stamping of requests instead. Data can also be accessed through Norwich Pharmacal orders, etc., in respect of civil litigation.

There was limited debate - it is a minority political issue.

Netherlands

The directive has been implemented in Dutch law in the Wet bewaarlicht Telecommunicatiegegevens. The Dutch law is in some aspects more strict, while in other aspects less or equally weak as the Directive. For example:

- In the Dutch implementation there is no direct relationship between the individuals whose data is preserved and the purpose of the preservation.
- In the Dutch implementation there is no exception for those that need professional secrecy, e.g. layers and doctors.
- In the Dutch implementation there are no meaningful boundaries of offences for which the preserved data may be used. Some of the offences have a maximum penalty of six months only, which extends the "serious crime" requirement of the directive.
- In the Dutch implementation there is no review by court or some independent body prior to the access to the data.
- There has been no justification for the period of retention (which is six months for internet-related data and twelve months for phone-related data. This is extra problematic as an evaluation of the law by the Dutch government shows that

The response has been as follows:

- The bodies that are supposed to enforce the law explained that they will keep on enforcing the law as long as it hasn't been revoked.
- The Dutch government announced it will prepare an analysis of the current situation (the Dutch law remains to be active, despite the Directive that invoked it's birth has been rendered illegal).
- The press is reporting that the government will keep enforcing the law.
- One of the political parties has made a proposal to cancel the Dutch implementation. The proposal attempts to undo the changes to the legal system that were made when data retention was introduced.
- On 18 November, the Dutch government finally issued its response to the CJEU ruling. The government wishes to retain its current data retention legislation. The Ministry of Security and Justice wrote a letter to the Parliament saying the CJEU’s judgments do not affect the Dutch law on data retention directly. The government intends to remedy the problems that the ruling creates for the Dutch law by making a few cosmetic changes to the national legislation. A request for data
some data is hardly ever accessed.

• Not all retained data is deleted after the retention period.
• The Dutch government recently proposed to remove the obligation to notify (afterwards) the subscriber whose data has been accessed, removing the subscribers possibility to take the police to court.

The Dutch law has seen a considerable amount of opposition when it was proposed, though it was approved by the Senate after "political opportunity overturned scientific rationality" as one of the Senators members justified his change from opposition to support.

The Netherlands does not have a constitutional court.

Norway

Norway is not a member of the EU. Norway is nevertheless closely connected to the EU, particularly through the EEA Agreement between the EU and the members of the European Free Trade Association EFTA (Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein), which means that all EU-legislation which is relevant to the Internal Market (such as the Data Retention Directive) was deemed to be, applies. Formally, though, an EU-directive, to become formally binding according to the EEA Agreement, must be accepted by the EEA Committee. This demands that all the EFTA-members must agree. In the case of the Data Retention Directive, Iceland refused to accept it, on grounds of principle and reference to fundamental rights. De jure, therefore, the directive is actually not binding on Norway (nor on the other EFTA-states).

The Norwegian Government (and Parliament) did, however, take it for granted that the directive would become binding and the implementation legislation was enacted in April 2011.

There was quite a massive public debate in advance of the implementation act. There was resistance from almost all the relevant legal and technical institutions/organizations in civil society, countered by an unusually engaged participation and lobbying in the public debate from the various entities in the law and enforcement and intelligence community. Parliament was sharply divided, but the members representing the Labour Party (Arbeiderpartiet) and (most of) the Conservative Party (Høyre), secured a 89-80
**Data retention in the EU following the CJEU ruling**

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<tr>
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<th>Description</th>
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<td>Norway</td>
<td>The retention obligation for the telecommunications operators and the Internet Service Providers, which, with regard to types of data, complied strictly with the directive, was implemented by enacting a revision of the existing Norwegian Electronic Communication Act. The shortest retention period allowed in the directive – six months – was chosen. There was no such retention obligation in existing Norwegian law at the time (apart from so-called “quick freeze”-orders in specific crime investigations – regulated in the general Criminal Procedure Act, as an implementation of Norway’s obligations as party to the European Cyber Crime Convention). Therefore, the introduction of the retention obligation also entailed a number of revisions in particularly the Criminal Procedure Act. Some main points were that access to retained data should – as the main rule – only be given to the police subsequent to a court order, and only in cases relating to crime which carries sanctions of at least four years of imprisonment or to other crimes specifically mentioned in the law. The implementation acts have, however, not been put into force, due initially to delays regarding the secondary legislation in which both the technical details pertaining to, <em>inter alia</em>, the level of encryption to be applied to retained data, and the question of how the costs of the new retention scheme should be divided. They will not now be put into force due to the ruling from the CJEU.</td>
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<td>Poland</td>
<td>The Directive was implemented in Poland in 2009. The retention period was equal for both telephone and Internet traffic data and amounted to 24 months from the date of the communication. After this time, a telecom operator or provider was required to destroy transmission data unless otherwise provided by the law. This period was shortened in January 2013 to 12 months. Access to retained data is allowed to the Police, national security agencies (Military Police, Military Counter-Intelligence Service, Fiscal Intelligence, Border Guard, Internal Security Agency, and Central Anticorruption Bureau), and judicial authorities. All authorities have the right to access traffic, subscriber and localization data in case of any crime, however trivial (not only in the case of a serious crime as it stands in the Directive). There is no legal threshold for seriousness of a crime or independent oversight of the disclosure of data by telecom providers to the applicants. Costs for the retention, storage, retrieval and security of this data are borne by telecom operators and ISPs did not react officially; they still obey the government and store data.</td>
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There was no political response to the CJEU ruling. Only group of senators prepared a proposition of legislation for a new data retention regime. This project was suspended until the verdict of the Constitutional Tribunal. ISPs did not react officially; they still obey the government and store data. On 30 July 2014 Polish Constitutional Tribunal finally gave its ruling on data retention (and other surveillance powers). The tribunal: • did not hold the data retention unconstitutional (in fact the Court couldn't even consider that - it wasn't included in the complaint) • but it said that access to data must be subjected to independent, external control and more safeguards are necessary (eg. closed list of purposes that justify the use of telecommunication data, additional protection for data covered by professional secrecy, strict rules on deleting data that is not necessary); • now the government and parliament have 18 months to change the law - if they fail, all provisions on data retention will become invalid. |
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<td>Romania</td>
<td>The Directive was implemented in Romania by law 298/2008 with a text closely following the Directive wording. The law 298 was considered unconstitutional by Constitutional Court Decision no. 1258, on 8 October 2009. After that decision, the government decided to do nothing for 3 years and then in 2012 it adopted in a hurry a new law 82/2012, almost identical to the one declared unconstitutional. The law 82/2012 was declared again unconstitutional by a new decision of the Romanian Constitutional Court on 8 July 2014. There has been no public reaction to the CJEU ruling. On the second day after the ruling the Government initiated a new expanding surveillance. According to a public statement of the Romanian Secret Service, there exists an internal note of the government, which “analysed the Romanian implementation of the Data retention directive and concluded that it does not breach human rights”. However, the data retention law 82/2012 was declared again unconstitutional by a new decision of the Romanian Constitutional Court from 8 July 2014 following some unconstitutional complaints raised in pending criminal trials. The decision was made on the grounds of both breaching the Romanian Constitution and based on the ECJ decision. The full reasoning has been published in Romanian. The Court unanimously found that the relevant provisions violated the Constitution and had to be abrogated. The decision refers to the CJEU judgment numerous times. The judges stressed that any interference with the right to privacy should be regarded as very serious. It referred to the creation of a feeling of constant surveillance and the potential to create a detailed portrait a person’s private life. The Court found the scheme was a disproportionate interference with the rights to privacy, secrecy of correspondence and freedom of expression. It criticized the lack of safeguards and precise rules.</td>
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<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>Thanks to a Slovakian Constitutional Court decision from 23 April 2014, Slovakia has suspended implementing the Data Retention Directive. It did so in proceedings (PL. ÚS 10/2014) initiated by European Information Society Institute (EISI) with support of thirty Members of Parliament. Although the case has been pending before the Court since October 2012, the Court decided to issue this preliminary measure and accept the case. On 23 April 2014, the Slovak Constitutional Court preliminarily suspended effectiveness of the Slovak implementation of Data Retention Directive. Preliminary suspension of effectiveness means that the retention laws are still formally valid, but have no legal effect until the Court decides on the merits of the complaint. The providers. The implementation of the directive was not controversial for the majority of politicians. Despite this fact, in 2011, two complaints concerning the implementation of the Directive to the Polish legal system were lodged in the Constitutional Tribunal. One of them – coming from the Democratic Left Alliance party – was refused (as all MPs’ cases are ‘redeemed’ after an election). The second complaint was submitted by the Ombudsman and the Constitutional Tribunal delivered a judgment 30 July 2014. Judgment was not a direct response to the CJEU ruling, but judges wrote about it in substantiation of the judgment. Note that Articles 49-51 in the Polish Constitution provide that the government should not collect an excessive amount of information on its citizens. The court decision did not mention those sections, because they were not in the original complaint. Full text of the relevant constitutional sections.</td>
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| Slovenia | Data retention has been in force in Slovenia since 2007 (telephone data) and 2009 (internet related data) with retention periods of 14 and 8 months respectively (in 2009 retention periods were shortened from previously 24 months). In the new Act on Electronic Communications, adopted to transpose the provisions of the amended telecommunications package, the legislator did not amend the provisions on data retention.\[1\] The Information Commissioner holds that the data retention provisions of the Act on Electronic Communications (ZEKom-1), which came into force on 15 January 2013, do not respect the principle of proportionality and have been transposed into the national law in contrast with the provisions of the Data Retention Directive. The Information Commissioner reasons that huge amounts of data are stored in advance, regardless of whether a person has fully obeyed the law, without any evidence or analysis that such a measure is necessary and is reflected in a greater impact on the prosecution of criminal offences. The law includes not only serious crimes as in the Directive, but all criminal offences, national security and the constitutional order, the security, political and economic interests of the state and for the purposes of national defence.\[2\] On 19 March 2013, the Information Commissioner requested the Constitutional Court to annul the data retention provisions of the Electronic Communications Act. The Information Commissioner therefore decided to file a request to the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia to assess the constitutionality of data retention provisions.\[3\] The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia abrogated the data retention provisions of the Act on Electronic Communications (ZEKom-1) in its judgment U-1-65/13-19 of 3 July 2014\[4\], following the constitutional request lodged by the Information Commissioner in March 2013 and ECJ judgment of 8 April 2014 in Digital Rights Ireland. The Court abrogated ZEKom-1 articles 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168 and 169 and instructed operators of electronic communications to delete retained data immediately after the judgment was published in the Official Gazette. The Court held data retention as disproportionate for the following reasons:  
  - non-selective retention of data constitutes a breach of rights of a large proportion of population that did not provide any reason to justify such this; – blanket data retention does not provide for anonymous use of communications, which is particularly important in cases where untraceable use is necessary (e.g. calling for help in mental distress);  
  - arguments for the selected retention periods (8 months for internet related and 14 months for telephony related data) were not provided nor explained in the legislative preparatory documents;  
  - the use of retained data was not limited to serious crime. |

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This table was prepared by Open Rights Group using information provided by member organisations of EDRI (European Digital Rights). It is not intended to provide a comprehensive survey of every European country or every response to the DRI decision. Many thanks to all those who contributed.
Data retention in the EU following the CJEU ruling


xlviii http://apti.ro/proiect-de-lege-retinerea-datelor (Romanian)

xlix Press release at: http://www.ccr.ro/noutati/COMUNICAT-DE-PRES-99 (Romanian) the reasoning was not published yet by the Court.


lii http://privacy.apti.ro/decizia-curtii-constitutionale-date-trafic/ (Romanian)


lvii http://edri.org/slovenia-data-retention-unconstitutional/ 12 and C-594/12